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OF l~'TAH by and through
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\V"HITTENBURG, Chairman, H. J.
CORLEISSEN and LAYTON
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BRIEF OF

Case No. ·7797

RESPONDENTS

STATEMENTS OF FACTS
This action was commenced in Wasatch County to
condemn for a state highway over lands o'\\rned by the
defendants in that county. On motion of the plaintiff,
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the cause was transferred to Utah County for trial. Defendants waived a jury, and the cause was tried without
a jury before the Honorable Joseph I£. Nelson, one of the
judges of the Fourth Judicial District.
The Statement of Facts, so called 1n the Brief of
Appellant, is so utterly 1nisleading, inaccurate, and unfair, that we deen1 it necessary to state the record and
the cause at length.
The premise of Appellant's ground for appeal, is the
staternent made in the brief that:
"The 7.89 acres taken by plaintiff was a portion of
a larger tract of pasturage, containing, before the
taking, 131.79 acres (Tr. 4). * * * All the improvements constructed by defendants in connection with
the creation and operation of the dairy farm are
placed upon the tract lying to the north and west
of U. S. Highway 40, no improvements were constructed on the tract, a part of which plaintiff took
by this action.''
"Defendants over plaintiff's objection, presented
their case on the theory that the plaintiffs, by the
taking of 7.89 acres pasture land from the tract of
131.79 acres, damaged the entire dairy farm as a
going business; that the entire farm, as an operating
unit, had been severely damaged by the taking of
less than eight acres pasture land (Tr. 20ff)."
The complaint of the plaintiff alleged:
"6. That each of the parcels sought to be condemned as hereinabove referred to and set forth,
is only a part of an entire parcel or tract or piece
2
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of property, or intere~t in or to property, owned by
the aforesaid defendants.''
There \Yere attached to the con1plaint as Exhibits
~ ~ ~\' ', · · . .-\-1'' and ~ ~ . .-\-2' ', uiaps showing the location,
general route, and tern1ini of the highway project, and
sho\Ying the property \vhich the plaintiff seeks.
~ · . -\nd
.

sho,ving the property of the defendants herein
as affected by these condemnation proceedings.''
The 1naps attached as Exhibits to the complaint, do
not describe the outside or any boundary lines of the
property of the defendants, and do not specify the acreage of the property of the defendants.
The ans\\~er of defendants ad1nits that part of paragraph 6, alleging that the parcels of land sought to be
conde1nned are a part of a larger tract of land owned
by the defendants, and that the taking of the said parcels
of property described in the complaint
"Will destroy and greatly injure and da1nage the
remaining property of said ranch owned by said
defendants.''
It is further affirmatively alleged in the answer of
defendants, that the lands through which the road is proposed to be constructed, were purchased and improved
by modernizing and reconditioning the dwelling house
located thereon, and by the construction of modern dairy
barns and sheds and a grade A sanitary milking parlor,
and other improven1ents thereon; new fences, cross
fences, a deep well, etc., and that the property was improved and developed into a modern dairy ranch, suitable
for the operation thereon of one hundred head of dairy

3
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cows.
It is further set out in the answer, that the plan of
operation of the dairy ranch is a part of a general L.D.S.
Church Welfare project of Wasatch County, and vicinity.
That the plan of operation includes the furnishing of
hay and grain from sinaller farrns in the Heber \Talley,
one by each Ward in the Stake, so that the 1nilking barns
and facilities would be used to the utmost capacity and
the lands would be devoted to pasturage, and that the
taking of the pasture land sought to be conde1nned 'vould
da1nage the whole set up and project substantially, and
reduce the carrying capacity of the ranch in pasturage
and that the value of the remainder would be lessened
and the defendants greatly da1naged by the severance.
It is further alleged in the answer, that there are no
available lands adjacent to said ranch or in the vicinity
thereof, that can be purchased to replace the lands sought
to be condemned.
The case proceeded to trial, the plaintiffs lead off
with a witness, Vernon Bridge (Tr. 3), who was the chief
right of way design engineer of the State Road Commission, and he produced a 1nap which was marked plaintiff's Exhibit "A" and placed upon the board (Tr. 4).
THIS MAP IS NOT THE SAME AS EXHIBIT "A"
ATTACHED TO THE COMPLAINT.
The Exhibit "A" offered and received in evidence,
is a large map which has printed upon it in large letters:
''Map Showing the Property of Cooperative Security Corp. in the NWl)t and SW14 NEJ/t_ of Section
32, T. 28 R.5E, SLM, and the portion i'equired for
4
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higlnvay purposes. Wasatch County, Septe1nber
1950. l>roj. No. S240 (1). Scale: 1" = 100'."
era yon, put on by the engineer:
'· CooperatiYe 8eenrity Corporation. Total acreage
- 131.79 _._\C re1naining = 123.90 AC."
The "·itness, Bridge, upon request, stepped down and
explained the Exhibit and the various markings and
colors thereof, and gave this answer ( Tr. 4) :
'~The

portion of the map sho"\vn outlined in red ink
lines represents the property owned by the CooperatiYe Seeurity Corporation before the taking by this
conden1nation, consisting of a total acreage of 131.79
acres."
This red line runs around the entire property, an
unbroken line, and around the portion of the property
of defendants lying on the North side of U.S. Highway
40, and it is upon this portion of the property that the
Inap shows the frame house, pump, cinder block milk
barn, frame barn, chicken coop and grainery as improveInents, and the witness then also pointed out the portions
and the colors of the part sought to be condemned.
This map and this tract, the whole area contained
within the outside red lines and shown on the map,
Exhibit "A", was referred to constantly and was before
the eyes of the Court and witnesses and counsel at all
ti1nes during the trial, was treated and considered as
the map, layout, description, boundary and fact of the
tract, parcel, piece, unit, ranch and property of the defendants affected by the condemnation.
We were surprised and astonished, therefore, to find
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in the State1nent of Facts in Appellant's Brief, as the
very basis of this appeal and running throughout the
Brief, both in the State1nent of Facts, and in the Argulnent of Points, that 7.89 acres taken by plaintiff "\vas a
portion of a larger tract of pasturage, containing, before
the taking, 131.79 acres, and that this 131.79 acres did
not include the land North and West of Highway 40.
Throughout the trial and in all of the testimony
and in the examination of witnesses, both by the defendants and the plaintiff, the piece, parcel or tract fro1n
which the portion conde1nned was taken, was treated and
considered as the property of the defendants affected by
the condemnation, that North and West of Highway 40, as
well as that South and East of Highway 40. Highway
40 was described as an easement right of way. It was
detailed how the cows after milking, were driven across
Highway 40 and turned into the pasture on the South
and East side; how they were brought home in the evening for milking across Highway 40, and to the n1ilking
barns. The matter of the new highway and its joining
into Highway 40, and the effect upon the driving of the
cows to and from the barns, was detailed by the witnesses
and throughout, with every witness, it was assumed and
taken for granted and not questioned but that this was
a unified farm and farm operation and that the parcel
which was damaged by the severance was all that remained and not just the meadows.
There was in the trial, the usual difficulty, in the
examination of witnesses, to keep then1 from considering
damage to the business carried on, as distinguished fron1
damage to the market value of the remainder, but the
evidence and testimony of the witnesses, lay and expert,
6
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all \\~ent to the theory that the farn1
one parcel or tract.

\Va~

a unit and

Perhaps the \vitnes8 1nost experienced as an expert
"ri tne~8 in conde1nna tions, a1uong all those who were
called by both parties, \vas Tho1nas E. Gaddis, of Salt
Lake City~ "Tho "~as called by the plaintiff on values
(Tr. 404). On cro~s exa1nination he gave the following
testin1ony (Tr. -l-25) :

· · Q.

So if you had a ranch that had a capacity of
pasture precisely for the herd he ran, and he
took a slice of that away from that use,
'vouldn't you figure that a buyer that wanted
to use it for the same purpose would feel that
he didn't have enough, and so he couldn't pay
the full value for this plant that's there?

.r\..

Well, -

Q.

Do you think even a willing buyer would hesitate on that score1

. A_. Not for just three acres, I don't think.
Q.

Well, cut off 10 acres out of 60. Wouldn't that
hit him~

A.

A little bit, yes.

Q.

A little bit. How much, in your opinion, would
it reduce in percentage of over-all value, that
little bit, taking ten percent of his pasture away
from a many (n1an) having a unit of that sort,
sir?

A.

What do you mean by over-all value1

Q.

Just what I said.
7
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A.

I didn't assess that.

Q. I didn't ask you to, but I'll let you assu1ne any
over-all value you want to, sir, and ans,ver 1ny
question. Don't spar with 1ne.
A.

The three acres.

Q.

l~ercentage

A.

The percentage of what

I said, sir, of alllO acres off fro1u GO.
now~

:)(: :)(: *
Q.

J>ercentage of difference in what a willing buyer
would pay for a setup based upon 60 acres of
pasture for a herd of dairy cows that equals
the capacity of his dairy i1nprovement unit, and
you took off 10 acres of his pasture.
:)(:

*

A.

You waiting for my

Q.

Yes,

A.

Six percent.

Q.· Six
A.

*
answer~

Percentage.

percent~

Yes."

H. Clay Cummings, called as a witness for defendants (Tr. 20), resides at Heber, and is engaged in livestock and ranching, and is President of the Wasatch
Stake, and has the total responsibility for the project
of providing milk for the Church Welfare Progran1. The
nature of the business on this property is the production
of milk, dairying, and so1ne beef production. It has been
in ownership of defendants about six years. He described
the structure and in1prove1nents upon the premises; there
8
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\ra~

a 1nodern ~ix roo1n ho1ne, culinary \Vater piped fron1
the spring about 1700 feet away, and a concrete headhon:5e built oYer the :5pring; there was a mode~n 1nilking
parlor constructed and planned for the milking of 75
head of CO\YS~ \Yi th holding rooms and all the necessary
equip1nent for n1ilking of the cows; there was a hay barn,
eonstrncted for the containing of about 150 tons of hay;
bull pens, calf sheds, feed racks, corral fences, concrete
corral coverings~ bridges and extensive fencing, ditching, headgates, leveling, re1noving of trees and- brush,
reseeding, fertilizing, a well, a deep well for house water
supply~ heating plant in the milk house, milking parlor.
These in1provements were all constructed after the year
19-+5~ excepting the hon1e, 'vhich was remodeled. There
'vas about $50,000.00 of cash put into these structures
and this an1ount 'vas about matched with labor (Tr. 26).
_.._\sked to describe the operation and use of these
structures on this property in relation to the land, and
particularly the land that is sought to be condemned, he
ans,vered: The home is used for the caretaker, the milk
parlor for milking 55 head of cows, at the date of taking,
February 17, 1950, the sheds for their convenience,
weather protection, feed racks for feeding them; water
supplies for washing the barn and equipment and providing the livestock with drinking water; fences were for
containing them within pasture boundaries; calf sheds
were used for caring for young calves; improvements
are very convenientaly located; there is a calf pasture of
3 acres up a little valley, or swale. The improvements are
built on a slope which provides perfect feed ground in
Winter, Spring and Fall, the corrals are located on a
general slope which provides for a perfect location for

9
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thein, and inunediately across Ii ighway 40 is a pasture
land which is used for grazing livestock. The crossing to
the pasture was indicated as a point just South of the
improvements and there was no obstruction or structures
of any kind to prevent passing back and forth and tttsing
the two sides of it as a unit (Tr. 28 ). And he described
the meadow and pasture land in detail. He valued the
property with the improvements as well worth $100,000.00 (Tr. 32), and testified that the losing of the ground
being taken and the inconvenience being created by the
construction of the road reduced the operations materially, without reducing the costs of operating.
Mr. Cummings was exa1nined at great length concerning the various improvements and facilities and the
uses to which the various portions of the farm were put,
and as to the effect of the relation of the use of the milking establishment and the improven1ents and facilities
thereof, to the pasture land in particular, and testified
as to ho'Y the taking of the new right of way through the
meadow land would affect the operation of the farm and
plant as an operating unit. He testified in substance
that the whole property, before the taking, was worth
$100,000.00, and that after the taking, the remainder of
the property was worth $80,000.00 in the market.
Lyman Holmes Rich was called as a witness by defendants. He is Extension Dairyman for the Utah State
Agricultural College, with degrees of B.S. at U.S.A.C.,
and M.S. at University of Minnesota. From 1925 to 1929
he was employed by the Utah State Agricultural College
as County Agent of Wasatch County, and has since become well acquainted with, and knows the dairy opera-

10
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tion~

in that ('1onnty.

lit> hn8 (•ha rge of the Dairy II erd
In1prove1nent Progra1n, an at~sociation throughout the
State of l 1 tnh, and hat~ n1ade regular visits to Wasatch
County, so1netin1es t\YO to six trips a year, and is well
acquainted \Yith the property involved in this case. When
the land \Yas first purchased by the Church, he advised
concerning its 1nanage1nent and assisted in purchasing
liYestock and 1neeting "Ti th groups in organizing the
project. He gaye testin1ony concerning the productivity
of the land and particularly the meadows, and of the
effect of the taking of the strip sought in condemnation
upon the \vhole. He testified (Tr. 86) concerning the
effect of driving heavy producing cows long distances,
and particularly the effect it would have upon this herd
if they \Vere driven to the Berg property, and returned
to the n1ilking plant, and that this distance is too far
to drive the cows.

Dee ..._4_. Broadbent, (Tr. 97), was a witness for defendants. He is a Professor of Agriculture and of Agricultural Economics and acts as Director of the Agricultural Experiment Station of the Utah State Agricultural
College, has a B.S. degree from that institution, and a
Master's degree from the University of Illinois, and additional scholastic training there. He has made a special
study of the operation of dairy farms and knows the
property in question. He came down with Mr. Rich and
another, and advised the committee upon the establishnlent of this project as an operating unit, the size and
the use of the land, and the practices that should be
adopted for the more efficient operation of the farm;
and, since, he has met with the committees and advised
them upon the layout and operational problems.

11
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I1e recognized that the liiniting factor in that dairy
unit was the proportion of summer pasture to the whole,
to Inaintain a dairy herd. The type of buildings constructed were set up to handle towards 100 cows, to
u1ake the Inost efficient use of the capital resources, the
buildings, ilnprovements and at least as a minimum for
economical operation, ( Tr. 101).
lie testified that about 60 acres of the land is fairly
productive land, and a limiting factor in the efficient and
economical operation of the farm. It was suggested that
the productivity of the land be increased to where it
would take care of a milking herd of exceeding 60 cows,
and improvements by way of leveling and rotation of
pasture were outlined, and he testified that the taking of
the land in condemnation would reduce the herd below
50 milking cows, without permitting any reduction in
the operating cost (Tr. 102), and so damage and depreciate the value of the entire set up and unit.

L. J. Lowe, a licensed real estate broker, gave testimony of values of the tract taken and the damage due
to the severance (Tr. 111) (Tr. 237).
Lowell Woodward, (Tr. 119), a soil scientist with
the Soil Conservation Service of the Federal Government, with a B.S. degree from U.S.A.C., with a major
in Agronomy, testified concerning the depths of the soil
in the various parts of the Church property and on the
Berg property.
Keith Holbrook, (Tr. 128), who operates a 437 acre
farm and is a real estate agent as well, and engaged
mainly in the dairy business, who resides at Salt Lake
City, qualified as an expert and gave opinion upon the

12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Yalue of the land taken and the :sl~Yerance da1nage. 1Iis
tt·~ tin1ony \Vould haYe justified a judgment of $21,7 40.00
( Tr. 134).
1'. H. Heal, (Tr. 162),

live~

at Provo and has owned
ranehe:s and sold 1nany dairy ranches, engaged in the real
e~tate busines8. qllalified as an expert, gave his opinion
a8 to value. His testin1ony \vould have justified a judgInent of $:2~.97 3.00, of \vhich $4,250.00 was for the land
taken and the balance for severance damage (Tr. 171).
TVelby Tr·. Young, (Tr. 186), of Heber City, is a

far1uer in the dairy business. He was Advisor of the
Farn1 Security Adnrinistration. in Wasatch County, a
g·oyerninent lending agency, a Director of the Heber Valley Dairymen's ..._:\._ssociation, Salt Lake Federated Milk
Producers, Officer of the A1nerican Dairy Association
of lTtah, and of the National Association, and gave detailed testimony concerning this property from long
acquaintaitce, and particular study and inforrnation. He
testified that in his opinion, the severance of the pr9perty
taken \Vould decrease the value of the remainder, including the buildings, and without reference to the personal property, and that the whole amount of the depreciation would be twenty percent of the over-all value,
prior to the taking, which he fixed at $98,000.00 (Tr. 201).

Jay Swain, (Tr. 246), iR the operator of the property
and detailed its use since November of 1949. The use
of Highway 40 and the changes in arrangement of
bridges, etc., \Vere detailed by him.
Nephi Probst, (Tr. 261), is a dairyman from
\\Tasatch County. He was County Ward Supervisor,
Chair1nan of the Agricultural Adjustment Agency of the

13
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U.S. Govern1nent, \Vater Master, Director of Irrigation
co1npanies, operates a farm at Midway, where he Inilks
fro1n 20 to 25 cows, and has some ranch cattle. He was
especially familiar with the property in question~ and is
in the Stake Presidency. J:Ie was particularly interested
in the noxious weed matter, having had much to do with
such troubles, and gave his opinion upon values.
Every witness who gave an opinion on the 1natter,
treated the farm as a unit and clearly pointed up the fact
that these new and costly improvements that were placed
upon the hillside North of Highway 40, were put there
and maintained and constructed to be used and used in
relation to all of the land belonging to the defendants
on the other side of Highway 40.
They pointed out, and took into consideration the
fact that the new highway joined into Highway 40 in
the front yard of the defendants. That the new highway
created a junction and greater use of the high,vay and
put a greater burden and danger and rendered less safe
and efficient the use of the property North of High"ray
40, in connection with the use of the remaining property
South of Highway 40.
It was not specificaJly proved where the fee of the
strip occupied by Highway 40 rests. It is assumed and
'vas assumed that the State has an easement under this
ground and that the right of ·way easement is upon and
across ground, the fee of which is vested in the defendants, the owners of the property on both sides of the
right of way, just as they are still the owners of the fee
of the land traversed by the new highway. The map,
Exhibit "A", shows this to be the fact by the surveys

14
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of the State.
There "~a8 te8ti1nony eoncerning the availability of
land8 to replace the land taken. This testin1ony 'vent to
t\YO different situations.
The ne\Y high,vay runB through the botton1 1neadow
land of the Provo Ri Ye r \~·alley and East,vard fro In the
JUnction \Yith High,vay 40, and the 1nilking barns, ete.
. ..-\. :Jir. Berg O\Yned the property up the canyon frm11
the Church property, and adjoining it. The ne\v high"~ay cut through his land also.
(Tr. 323). He was
1)ern1itted to testify that jn the n1onth of April 1950, he
had a conyersation with :\f r. Cun11nings and ''offered'.'
to sell to the defendants pc:trt of his ground East of them
and South of the new highway on over to the river
(Tr. 324); but did not state at what price or upon what
c~onditions; but on cross-e~a.mination (Tr. 335), this witness testified persistently that he would not sell his land,
and he said under oath (Tr. 336) :
"It is not for sale."
The testimony is, also, to the effect that the piece
rnentioned by him is not as good land as that taken fro1n
the defendants.
The other item of '~replacement property" \Vas
developed from the cross -examination of Mr. Cu11nnings.
He testified (Tr. 52), that since the property in condemnation 'vas taken, the defendants have leasPd fro1n
the New Park Mining (jolnpany, so1ne territory V\Test
and North of the barns, on an annual or yearly basis,
and that the lease is subject to cancellation at any tiine
i-he O\vner 1night desire t') cancel it, and he further tes-
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~ified

that this property v1as not for sale and that the
1nining company would not sell it.
As indicated, this case was tried to the Court \vithout
a jury. The fact of the tract was specifically !uund by
the Court as a trier of facts as follows :
"6. That each of the parcels sought to he condeinned as hereinabove referred to and set forth i8
only a part of an entire parcel or tract or piece of
property, or intere8~ in or to property, OYvned by
the aforesaid defendants. The said map introduced
by plaintiff, and received in evidence marh:ed Exhibit "A" shows the description and locatio11 of the
aaid entire parcel or 1ract of land owned by defendants and affected by these proceedings.
''Said property consisted of approximately 131.79
acres of land, all o£ Vtrhich was used as a unit by
defendants in the operation of a farm and as a dairy
:farm. Situate upon the lands are a dwellin~ house,
modern dairy, barns, f;heds, a grade A sanitary milking parlor, carrols, cement feeding platfo:rms and
mangers, and a deep 'Vell flowing pure water used
in the home and in the dairy barn, with pipes and
troughs for its control, as well as fences and canals
and ditches for the Pse and control of the irrigaticn
and cultivation of said lands. Said farm as so laid
out and equipped "', .Tas suitable for the operation
thereon of a modern 0airy and for the acommodation
of one hunred head of dairy cows. Said dairv raneh
'
and farm was so us~d by defendants as part of a
general L.D.S. Church Welfare project of Wasatch
County and vicinity and in cooperation with the ten
1

._

t,
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'r ard~ of the

\ Yas a teh Stake of said Church.''

"·The seYl~rauee of the portion sought to be taken
and \!onden1ned by p 1 aintiff in these proceedings,
and the con~truction of the iu1proven1ent in the Inanner proposed by the 11laintiff will greatly da1nage
the re1nainder of s3.id parcel and pre1nises of the
plaintiff and greatly t3epreciate the Inarket value of
the ~aid re1nainder. ''

By these Findings, thQ Court also found the fact to
be that the property re1nainding to the defendants after
the conden1nation 'vas greatly damaged, and the Inarket
value of the ren1ainder r.reatly depreciated.
The Cottrt, as trier of the facts, and in the formula
of our statute, found thP fair n1arket value of the lands
and improven1ents sought to be condemned to be the sum
of $2,564.25, and the damages that accrued to the parcel
and pre1nises of the defendants not sought to be condemned by reason of i~s severance from the portion
sought to be condemned, and the construction of the
improvements in the manner proposed by the plaintiff
to be $10,919.57.

There were no benef~ts pleaded, proved or claimed
to the defendants from the taking.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POTNT I
THE DAIRY FARM IS A UNIT OPERATION AND
ONE "PARCEL" IN ONE OWNERSHIP.
CONTIGUITY IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE.
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PO~NT

II

NO ADDITIONAL PASTURE LAND WAS AVAILABLE TO DEFENDANTS.

POINT III
THE CONDEMNEE HAS THE RIGHT TO INSIST
UPON BEING PAID IN CASH, BOTH FOR THE LAND
TAKEN AND FOR HIS DAMAGES TO THE REMAINDER.

POINT IV
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT ART CONCLUSIVE UPON THE FACTS OF VALUE OF THE PROPERTY TAKEN, UNITY OF THE PARCEL AND OF DAMAGE THERETO AND THE AMOUNT
THEREOF RESULTING FROM THE SEVERENCE.

POINT V
THERE ARE NO ERRORS OF LAW REVIEWABLE
BY THE SUPREME COURT CITED AS GROUNDS FOR
REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT OR NEW TRIAL.

POINT VI
CONCLUSION:
AFFIRMED.

THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE

ARijUMENT
POTNT I
THE DAIRY FARM IS A UNIT OPERATION AND
ONE "PARCEL" IN ONE OWNERSIDP.
CONTIGUITY IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE.

Upon the facts pertaining to the use of the farn1
jmprovements in relation to the pasture land, there is

18
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no di~pute. The Inilking barn~, sheds and other facilities
\vere placed upon the south slope north of Highway 40
becan~e, despite the haz,!lrds of High,vay 40, it was the
be~t plaee and ~ituation, <~nd they 'vere built to a capacity
to 1uate.h the excellent pasture o'vned by the saine entity.
The inconvenience of eros~ing -±0 \vas not a sufficient
objection~ in the eye~ of the experts from the College
and the practical dairy 1uen, to deter the layout as the
conden1nor found it.
The easernent for th~ right of way over the fee under
Highway -±0 \vas shown upon the map (Exhibit A) of
the condemnor, but did not break the red line outlining
the parcel fron1 which the part sought was carved.
The existence of the highway does not divide the
farn1 into separate parcels.
That contiquity is n0t an absolute, IS abundantly
established by the decisions.
There is an annotation on the question of the relation of unity of use and contiquity of pro-perties essential
to the allowance of damage~ in Eminent Domain proceedings found in 6 ALR ('2d), commencing at page 1197.
The general rules on the question are summarized In
the following paragraphs, on page 1200:
"Whatever the theory of compensation for injury
to the remaining land, it conternplates prin1arily a
single piece or tract of land of which part is taken.
The courts have extended the rule, howeveri to embrace situations in whjch a tract is crossed by something lineally ilnposecl upon it-whether by nature,
by 1nan, or by legal description-which viewed obSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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jectively divides it into sections, but which. \vithin
the intent of the rule, does not d~stroy its unity as
a single property. In certain unusual cases, they
have even departed (;ntirely frorn the basis of the
rule, namely, the virtual contiguity of the holdings,
and applied the concept of unity to properties separated from one another by the lands of other owners or by navigable \Vaters.''
The principle applied to lands used for farrning and
sirnilar enterprises which are separated by a high,vay
are treated at page 1220 :
"12~

TRACTS SEPARATED BY HIGH.\VAY.

"The same general principle applies in the case
of rural tracts separated by a highway. The effect
of the highway in separating them may be countered
by proof that they are being held or employed together for the general purposes of the property,
whether farming, stock-raising, logging, or other
productive entertprise. It is not always that this
proof is necessary, for occasionally a court will recognize an actual contiguity in the tracts if the fee is
in the owner. A resort to this alternative rnay support the owner's claim where no present use of the
land is shown. See Par. 2, supra. Between the two
principles it is seldo1n that the crossing by a public
easement, of a piece of rural property which is
otherwise a unit in 1tse or value, is allowed to interfere with an award of damages with reference to
the whole property 1,ohen part is taken.''
In support of the quoted staternent, the following
decisions are cited to the general proposition that a high20
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cutting the propert~· of the conden1nee i:.-5
in~nfficient to de8troy the unity of a farin, ranch, or
cther agricultural property which is used as a whole .

\Yay or

~treet

..:\L~-\1~~-\.Jt..\

Pryor v. Li1nestone County (1931)
2:22 .A.la. t):2l, 13-i ~o. 17 ( 'videning of highway across
ranch of 3,:200 acres).
-

IXDl~-\.N ~\

- Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v.
S1uith (191:2) 177 Ind. 5:2-±, 97 NE lG-! (fee in landowner).
I0,,1 ...\ - Han1 v. ''Tisconsin, I. & N. R. Co. (1883)
61 Iowa 716, 17 NW 157.
K~\NS.A.S

- Kansas City, E. & S. R. Co. v. Merrill
(1881) 25 Kan. -!21 (large ranch, taking of strip for railroad.)
:JI..:-\_RYL . .\ND - Cf. Marchant v. Baltiinore (1924)
1-!6 ~Id. 513, 126 A 884.
:JIA.SS . -\.CHl~SETTS
.
- Tucker v. Massachusetts C.
R. Co. ( 1875) 118 Mass. 546.
:JIINNESOTA - Cf. Colvill v. St. Paul & C. R. Co.
(1872) 19 l\Iinn. 283, Gil 240; St. Paul & S.C.R. Co. v.
~I urphy ( 1873) 19 Minn. 500, Gil 433.
MISSOURI - St. Louis, M. & S.E.R. Co. v. DrumInond Realty & Inves.t Co. (1907) 205 Mo. 167, 103 SW
977, 120 Am. St. Rep. 724; Kansas City & G.R. Co. v.
I-Iaake (1932) 331 Mo. 429, 53 SW2d 891, 84 ALR 1477.
NEW YORK - New York, W.S. & B.R. Co. v.
LeFevre (1882) 27 Hun. 537.
PENNSYL\TANIA- Watson v. Pittsburgh & C.R.
Co. ( 18GO) 37 Pa. 469; Baker v. Pennsylvania R. Co.
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(1912) 236 Pa. 479, 84 A 959.
WISCONSIN - Welch v. Milwaukee & St. P.R. Co.
( 1870) 27 Wis. 108.
Corpus Juris Secundum (29 C.J.S. 982), has also
~tated the rule and coallated the cases, and stated the
law as we believe it to be, 1neasured by the standard of
justice and authority:

''Ordinarily contiguity or physical connection between the separate parcels is essential to the requisite unity. If, however, there be no such physical
connection, the separate parcels may be considered
as one if they are so inseparably connected in the
use to which they are applied that injury or destruction of one must necessarily and permanently affect
the other. Hence, although the several tracts do not
actually adjoin, they may be regarded as one if the
owner has a connecting right of way over the intervening lands. So the fact that several tracts used
as one are separated by a street or highway, a watercourse, a railroad right of way, or a county line does
not necessarily prectude them from being considered
as one in determining the damages. It has even
been held that, where two or more parcels of land
are used as one enterprise and constitute such dependent elements thereof that the taking of one
necessarily injures the other, they may be taken as
one, even though separated by an intervening fee."
Included in the sitations to this statement are some
of the cases cited in the A.L.R. (2d) coallation. Of significance in the group is the case of State vs. H oblitt,
from Montana, 288 P. 181.

22
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rrhe Hoblitt ranch con:5i~ted of 1-l:7 acres, lying East
of the rail\Yay right of \Yay and a 10-acre tract lying
,Y.est thereof. and used as a eo\Y pasture. The land taken
consisted of ~¥2 aeres of the 10-aere tract lying adjacent
to the raihYay right of way.
The ranch \\~as crossed by a highway which paralleled the rail,Yay and between the two was the dwelling
house. The barns and corrals were across the road from
the house. Hoblitt \\~as engaged in farming, dairying and
raising cattle. horses and hogs for market, and his arrangement was very convenient, and his n1ilk was taken
up and the can returned practically at the milking place.
The question for determination was as to what items of
da1nage should be considered, and after stating the rule
in practically the identical language of the Corptts Juris
citation, with specific application to the 10-acre tract,
the Court said :
'~Here

the 10-acre tract is isolated from the ranch
proper and forms but an inconsiderable portion
thereof; but, as it is used for the pasturing of dairy
cows, milked upon the ranch, the additional inconvenience and danger in the use of the pasture after
the highway is constructed would furnish an i~em of
damages to be considered. Gaddis v. Cherokee
County, 195 N. C. 107, S. E. 358; Texas Electric Service Co. v. Perkins (Tex. Com. App. 1930) 23 S. W.
(2d) 320."
In that case the jury awarded $400.00 for the land
taken and $400.00 consequental damages, and the Court
said: ''The jury considered and made an award for all
such da1uaged proved'', which included the da1nages to
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the whole far1n on both sides of the highway due to the
severance of the right of way from the 10-acre tract.
In a Federal case,
Boetjer v. United States
143 F (2d) 391
Cert. denied
324 us 772
89 L. ed. 618
65 S Ct 131
It is said:
''The first question before us here, therefore, and
the basic one in all severance damage cases, is what
constitutes a 'single' tract as distinguished from
'separate' ones. The answer does not depend upon artificial things like boundaries between tracts as established in deeds in the owner's chain of title ... ,
nor does it depend necessarily upon whether the o'vner acquired his land in one transaction or even at
one time ... Neither does it wholly depend upon
whether holdings are physically contiguous. Contiguous tracts may be 'separate' ones if used separately ... and tracts physically separated from one
another may constitute a 'single' tract if put to an
integrated unitary use or even if the possibility of
their being so combined in use in the reasonably
near future . . . is reasonably sufficient to affect
market value.''

THE CARLSON CASE
Appellant relies upon the Carlson case for a reversal
of the judgment in this case upon both points of his
argument: ( 1) The damage to the property North of
24

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

High\Yay 40, and (2) the aYailability of lands in the
Yieinity to replaee the land~ taken, in place of all severance danutges.
l)l{l)\7"0

RI\""I~~l{ \\~ ..:\ 'l~ER lT~_b~RS

ASSN. v. CARLSON
103 lTtah 93 : 133 P. (2d) 777

rrhe ('iarlson ease does not decide the question
\\~hether or not lands n1u:5t be contiguous or whether lands
Inu~t be physieally i1npaired by the construction of the
project, in order to establish a case for severance dainage:5 or for dan1ages to lands not condemned but impaired
by the i1nproven1ent. l\lr. Justice McDonough, in the
1najority opinion, was careful to state that it was not
necessary in that case to decide that question.

In this case, for reasons presently stated,
it is not necessary to decide whether or not lands
must be contiguous or whether lands must be.physically intpaired by the construction project, in order
to establish a case of severance damages or for damages to lands not condemned but impaired by the
improvement.''
"(1)

The point which ruled the Carlson case was the fact,
assumed by the Court on the appeal, that the proof in
the case showed that the pasture land inundated by the
reservoir, which was located a mile and a half from the
home properties of the owner, could have been replaced
by the purchase of similar lands to those taken and
actually located nearer to the base property than those
already owned by Carlson.
Although this was disputed 1n the evidence, the
appellate court assu1ned it to be a proven fact, and made
it the basis of the decision reversing the case and grantSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing a new trial.
The case was not re-tried, nor was a rnotion for rehearing rnade. At about the time the matter \Vas ruled,
an intensive campaign in the papers and on the radio
had been carried on by the interests prornoting the Echo
Reservoir protesting the high verdicts of the juries in
Wasatch County in those cases, and including the verdict
in the Carlson case, and settlements were effected, obviating the necessity of re-trials.
The dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Larson in the
Carlson case is a very clear statement of the whole matter, and numerous cases are cited to support his statement:
''If several tracts are used to get her as a farn/;, in
deter1nining the compensation to be paid the owner
on condemnation of only part of the land, the tract
constitutes a unity and the injury to the whole farm
should be considered. Grand River Dam Authority
v. Thompson, 10 Cir., 118 F. 2d 242. See also U.S.
ex rei, T.V.A. v. Powelson, 4 Cir .. 118 F.2d 79, 87,
modifying U.S. ex rei T.\T.A. v. Southern St. Power
Co., D.C., 33 F. Supp. 519; U.S. v. Crary, D.C., 2 F.
Supp. 870; City of Stockton v. Marengo, 137 Cal.
App. 760, 31 P.2d 467, 470; State v. Hoblitt, 87 Mont.
403, 288 P. 181; Dean v. County Bd. of Education,
210 Ala. 256, 97 So. 741; Duggan v. State, 214 Iowa
230, 242 N.,V. 98; City of Middleboro v. Chasteen,
285 Ky. 427, 148 S.W. 2d 295; Darlington v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 278 Pa. 307, 123 A. 284; Atchiston T. &
S.F.R. Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 505,
57 P.2d 575; City of Stockton v. Ellingwood, 96 Cal.
26
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·)-.- p.• •)•)Q.
•)l) '\._·1•J• , p. 1""'
')7 no t e 66., ..')9
. .-\ pp. -l)~
' \.... -4tl
--"~·tu,
C.J .8 .. En1inent Do1nain, Sec. 1-±0, note 19; Texas
E1npire Pipe Line v. ~te,vart, 331 ~Io. 525, 55 S.W.
2d :283 ~ reversing Id., :Jio . ..:\pp., 35 S.W. 2d 627; City
of St. l~oni~ v. ~t. Louis l.l\1. & S.R. Co., 272 Mo.
SO. 197 S. \V.. 107. ''

It Inay be that 've ~tretched the rule of unity of use
to the breaking point in the Carlson case; but, mainfestly,
the factual difference in this case fron1 that case, and the
reservation of the Court, in the 1najority opinion, destroys any potency of that decision as authority against
the position of the respondents in this case .
I>

.:\.nd there are cases that would sustain the allowance
of severance da1nage to tracts separated by land of other
private o'vners, if a permissive right of way existed
across the intervening land, or the two parts were connected by a high,vay, as was the case in Carlson's Case.
'Vestbrook v. Muscatvie U. & S.R. Co.

115 Iowa 106
88 w.w. 202
In the majority opinion in the Carlson Case, there
is the following statement:
''All of the cases in this Court, which we have been
able to find, have predicated both severance damages
and damages .to lands not taken, on some physical
injury to lands not condemned * * * or some other
condition which would operate to depreciate the
market val1te of the }Jroperty remaining,"
and rites the following cases from the Supreme Court of
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the State of Utah:
State v. District Court
94 u 384
78 p (2d) 502
This was an original proceeding 1n the Supren1e
Court for a writ of prohibition against the lo,ver court
in a action brought to enjoin the defendants, State Road
Commission and others from constructing a viaduct over
a street crossing. The case involved matter of procedure.
The opinion of the majority by Judge Hoyt and the
dissenting 1ninority opinion by Justice Wolfe together
take 23 printed pages in the Pacific Report, but not one
word about what is a" parcel" or what is "contiguity".
Ba1nberger Electric R. Co. v. Public Utilities Co1n.
59 Utah 351
204 Pac. 314

An original proceeding for a writ of review against
the Public Utilities Commission from an order to the railroad to discontinue a private crossing. Procedural matters were determined.
Morris v. Oregon S.L.R. Co.
36 Utah 14
102 P. 629
Action by an abutting owner for damages fron1 the
construction of a railroad in the street. Here is a reference to ''condemnation.''
''Such an action is no different in principle fro1n
an action for da1nages to the remaining property
where a part only is condemned. The easement the

28
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abutting o'vner has in the ~treet is a property right,
and an interference w·ith this right is, to the extent
of the interference, dee1ned a taking of property for
"Thich, if ~uch taking directly injures the abutting
property, as aforesaid, the owner may recover damages.''
San Pedro

F.~\.

& L.R.R. Co. v. Board of Education

32 Utah 305
90 Pac. 565
. .-\ conden1na tion case, for right of v.ray across a
parcel of land occupied in part by a school house.
·'Severance'' not involved or mentioned.
Dooly Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co.
9 Utah 31
33 Pac. 229
Abutting owners enjoined an additional track on the
street.
''In such a case an abutting owner need not stand
by and see his property injured without having any
means of redress.''
Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western R. Co.
28 Utah 207
77 Pac. 849
Action to restrain a switch track.
Injunction sustained against track located on private property.
"Before the appellant railway con1pany can subSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ject the property in question, or any part thereof, to
the burdens to which it would be subjected by the
running of cars and engines over the switch referred
to, it Inust proceed under the law of en1inent do1nain,
as conte1nplated by the foregoing provision of the
Constitution, and as required by the statutes of this
state."
Contrast the worth of the cases cited in the n1ajorit~~
opinion, with those cited by Mr. Justice Larson, in the
1ninority opinion in the Carlson case!
In fact, we find no better exposition anywhere of the
rule as applied generally throughout the several states
than that stated in the minority opinion which we quote:
Provo River Water lTsers Association v. Carlson

133 P (2d) at page 782
''The right of eminent do1nain exists only upon the
condition that full payment be 1nade to the owner
of the property taken for all damages he sustains by
or as a result of the taking of the property. This
contemplates not only payment for the property
actually taken for use of the condemnor but for
damages resulting to the condemnee by the loss of
the property so taken. Normally we say the condemnee is enti tied to recover the value of the land
actually taken, plus the damages to the land not
taken. This expression too often leads to misapplication of the true rule of recovery of damages.
We should think of it in terms of property, not in
terms of land. The condemnee is entitled to recover
the full value of the loss he sustains by the infringe30
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1uent of and interference '''ith his legal rights-the
rig·ht to n~e his physical holding:_.; in any legititnate
\vay or busines~ he Inay choose. The old rule was
inclined to be rigid and confine the da1nages recoverable to the particular tract of land fron1 \vhich the
taken part \Ya~ seYered. It was then extended to
per1nit considertaion of da1nages, if any, to contiguous tract~. Later the vision of the law becon1e
clearer. Instead of seeing through a glass darkly,
the courts realized that dan1age to property rights
were not al\\'"ays identical with damage to land as
such, and the rule of unity of use was reconized and
applied. This is son1etimes spoken of as unity of
property. If Yarious tracts of land not contiguous
are owned by the condemnee, and are so used, and
operated that the uses to which the owner is putting
the tracts none of which is taken, is substantially interfered 'vith that constitutes a damage due to the
taking \Vhich is cognizable in the action. The rule
is thus laid down in 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, Sec.
140, page 982: 'To constitute a unity of property
\vithin the rule, there must be such a connection
or relation of adaption, convenience, and actual and
permanent use as to make the enjoyment of the parcel taken reasonably and substantially necessary to
the enjoyment of the parcels left, in the most advantageous and profitable manner in the business for
which they are used. * * * The separate parcels may
be considered as one if they are so inseparably connected in the use to which they are applied that injury or destruction of one must necessarily and perInanently affect the other'."
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rrhe writer has examined again every decision in
every condernnation case from the Supreme Court of
Utah which he can locate, and has not found a single decision which defies ''parcel'' or ''tract'', or ''piece of
property", or "interest in or to property", or fixes a
rule limiting severance damage to lands contiguous to
the land taken, except the foregoing quotation fron1 the
1ninority opinion of ~Ir. Justice Larson in the Carlson
Case.
It is, therefore, suggested that recourse be had to
the annotators and definitions and decisions from other
jurisdictions. Those hereinbefore cited abundantly sustain his opinion and statement of the law and the rule,
and justify the julgment for severance damages made
in this case by Judge Nelson.
PO~NT

II

NO ADDITIONAL PASTURE LAND WAS AVAILABLE TO DEFENDANTS.

POJNT III
THE CONDEMNEE HAS THE RIGHT TO INSIST
UPON BEING PAID IN CASH, BOTH FOR THE LAND
TAKEN AND FOR HIS DAMAGES TO THE REMAINDER.
The facts of the case do not warrant a finding by

the appellant court, not made by the trier of the facts,
that there was additional land in the vicinity that the
condemnee could acquire with the price paid for the land
taken from them.
It needs no argument that a year to year lease
revocable at will of the lessor, is not a lawful substitute
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n1oney dtH' a~ the just eo1npPn~a tion 'vhich the
Con~titution require~ shall be paid before land it-~ taken
or da1naged hy the po,ver of the State.

for

en~h

:Jir. Berg te~tified under oath that his adjacent property "·a~ not for sale!

. A. negotiation a~ nebulous as the ~ •offer'' hinted at
by the ...:-\.ttorney tieneral in the Brief, is not a lawful
~ubstitute for the coin of the realm.
The defendant i~ entitled to 1noney and ntay not be
contpelled to accept substitute land elsewhere.
The trial Court heard the evidence pertaining to the
leased land and the Berg land, including matters touching it~ quality, location and value, as well as ''availability,'' and heard the owner himself, Mr. Berg, swear
under oath that his land was not for sale.
In the matter of replacement lands, the majority
opinion in the Carlson Case is relied upon by appellant
for reversal of this case.
The writer has examined again every decision in
every condemnation case from the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah which he can locate, and has not found a
single decision requiring a condemnee to prove he cannot
find lands equal in value and use in the immediate
vicinity for sale at the price fixed for the land taken,
before he can recover severance damages!

PfJJNT IV
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT ART CONCLUSIVE UPON THE FACTS OF VALUE OF THE PROPERTY TAKE.N, UNITY OF THE PARSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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CEL AND OF DAMAGE THERETO AND THE AMOUNT
THEREOF RESULTING FROM THE SEVERENCE.

Throughout the cases cited in this brief, reference is
frequently n1ade to the question of the relation of the
Judge and the Jury in the matter of facts to be found.
Here Judge Nelson was both Judge and Jury.
Every question raised by the appellant is upon a
question of fact.
The unity of the parcel is a proved fact and a fact
found.
l\1:ay this Court ''weigh'' the

evidence~

POTNT V
THERE ARE NO ERRORS OF LAW REVIEWABLE
BY THE SUPREME COURT CITED AS GROUNDS FOR
REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT OR NE·W TRIAL.

There are no errors in the reception of evidence, or
other rulings in the course of the trial, cited by Appellant
and relied upon for reversal of the judgment, and no
motion for new trial was made.
The Attorney General would have the Court reverse
this judgment upon his ipsi dixit that "the defendants'
dairy simply was not diminished in value to that extent
($10,919.57) by the taking of approximately 6% of its
pasturage.''
POTNT VI
CONCLUSION:
AFFIRMED.

THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE

The award of damages in this case is in a sum sub-
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~tantially lP~::-;

than the eYidence \Yould have justified.

There \Ya:s a severance da1nage to the s1nall tracts of
pa~tnre land that 'vere i:solated by the location of the new
higlnvay~ and to the entire area of the pasture land, as
\\·ell as to the sale Yalue of the dairy layout and improvelnents on the North side of Highway 40.
There \Yas a eonsiderable diversity of opinion among
the \vitne~:ses, but all \vould give son1e to each of those
parts.
The testin1ony of the \vitness, Bridge, called by the
plaintiff, \Yortld justify severance damage of 6 percent of
the entire farn1, including the barns and other improvelnents on the North side of the highway.
The trial judge was duly considerate of the welfare
on both sides of the issue.

No one in this case had a personal interest of any
kind.
There \vas a fair trial and a just decision, which we
sub1nit ought to be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted

L. C. MONTGOMERY
ARTHUR WOOLLEY
Attorneys for Respondents
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